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BABU BARKYA THAKUR vs THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS. On 1960-08-08

HEADNOTE

On131that date the petitioner proposed to lead evidence of ownersof several pieces of land included in the area notified foracquisition to prove that the lands included in the scheduleto the notification were not as a matter of fact required bythe third respondent for any public purpose and that thethird respondent had even negotiated for the purchase of thesaid lands by private treaty, but the second respondentrefused permission to lead such evidence on behalf of thepetitioner.The petitioner raises a number of questions of law attackingthe constitutionality of the land acquisition proceedingsand prays for orders or directions to the State Governmentnot to give its consent to the aforesaid acquisition unders.39 of the Act nor to enter into any agreement with thethird respondent under s. 41 of the Act nor to issue anotification under s. 6 of the Act declaring that the landin question is needed for a public purpose, because aftersuch a declaration the petitioner may be deprived of theopportunity of contending that the land was not needed for apublic purpose.The third respondent, through its Business Manager, has putin an affidavit in answer to the petitioner's case and hascontended that this writ petition is premature and notmaintainable, that so far, only a notification under s. 4 ofthe Act has been issued and objections under s. 5A on behalfof the petitioner have been heard by the second respondent,that the State Government has
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On131that date the petitioner proposed to lead evidence of ownersof several pieces of land included in the area notified foracquisition to prove that the lands included in the scheduleto the notification were not as a matter of fact required bythe third respondent for any public purpose and that thethird respondent had even negotiated for the purchase of thesaid lands by private treaty, but the second respondentrefused permission to lead such evidence on behalf of thepetitioner.The petitioner raises a number of questions of law attackingthe constitutionality of the land acquisition proceedingsand prays for orders or directions to the State Governmentnot to give its consent to the aforesaid acquisition unders.39 of the Act nor to enter into any agreement with thethird respondent under s. 41 of the Act nor to issue anotification under s. 6 of the Act declaring that the landin question is needed for a public purpose, because aftersuch a declaration the petitioner may be deprived of theopportunity of contending that the land was not needed for apublic purpose.The third respondent, through its Business Manager, has putin an affidavit in answer to the petitioner's case and hascontended that this writ petition is premature and notmaintainable, that so far, only a notification under s. 4 ofthe Act has been issued and objections under s. 5A on behalfof the petitioner have been heard by the second respondent,that the State Government has yet to be satisfied as towhether the acquisition is for purposes specified in s. 40of the Act and so long as the previous consent of the appro-priate Government has not been given, the provisions of ss.6 to 37 of the Act cannot be put into operation.It hasbeen laid down by s. 39 that the machinery of the LandAcquisition Act, beginning with s. 6 and ending with s. 37,shall not be put into operation unless two conditionsprecedent are fulfilled, namely, (1) the previous consent ofthe appropriate Government has been obtained and (2) anagreement in terms of s. 41 has been executed by theCompany.136The condition precedent to the giving of consent aforesaidby the appropriate Government is that the Government has tobe satisfied on the report of the enquiry envisaged by s.5A(2) or by enquiry held under s. 40 itself that the purposeof the acquisition is ;to obtain land for the erection ofdwelling house-, for workmen employed by the Company or forthe provision of amenities directly connected therewith orthat such acquisition is needed for the construction of somework which is likely to prove useful to the public.721.137appear on the words of the Act contained in Part 11, whichcontains the operative portions of the proceedings leadingup to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for aCompany may or may not be for a public purpose, theprovisions of Part VII make it clear that the appropriateGovernment cannot permit the bringing into operation theeffective machinery of the Act unless it is satisfied asaforesaid, namely, that the purpose of acquisition is toenable the Company to erect dwelling houses for workmenemployed by it or for the provision of amenities directlyconnected with the Company or that the land is needed forconstruction of some work of public utility.
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SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT

1 of 9 PETITIONER: BABU BARKYA THAKUR Vs.RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS. DATE OFJUDGMENT: 08/08/1960 BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)BENCH:SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)IMAM, SYED JAFFERSARKAR, A.K.WANCHOO, K.N.SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1960 AIR 1203 CITATOR INFO : R 1961 SC 343 (5,7) R 1962 SC 764 (5,21) R 1963 SC 151 (21,34,53) RF 1965 SC 646 (9) RF 1965 SC 995 (6) RF 1966 SC1593 (15) R 1966 SC1788 (18,20) D 1967 SC1074 (8) O 1970 SC 564 (4) RF 1971 SC 306 (5,10) D 1973 SC1150 (9) RF 1973 SC1461 (1017) R 1978 SC 597 (128,129) RF 1980 SC1678 (3) R 1985 SC 736 (5,14) D 1985 SC1622 (13,15) RF 1992 SC1827 (2) ACT: Land Acquisition--Preliminary notification--Land needed forcompany--Non-mention of public purpose--LegalityProceedings, if violate fundamental rights--Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 4, 5A, 6, 40--Constitution ofIndia, Arts. 19(1)(f), 31. HEADNOTE: By a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, the State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) sought toacquire certain lands, including those of the petitioner,which were likely to be needed by a company, manufacturingsteel bars and rods, for its factory and buildings andappointed a Special Land Acquisition Officer to function asa Collector under s. 5A of the Act. The petitioner by anobjection filed before the said officer denied that thelands were required for a public purpo
1 of 9 

PETITIONER: BABU BARKYA THAKUR Vs.
RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.
DATE OF
JUDGMENT: 08/08/1960
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)IMAM, SYED JAFFERSARKAR, A.K.WANCHOO, K.N.SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1960 AIR 1203 CITATOR INFO : R 1961 SC 343 (5,7) R 1962 SC 764 (5,21) R 1963 SC 151 (21,34,53) RF 1965 SC 646 (9) RF 1965 SC 995 (6) RF 1966 SC1593 (15) R 1966 SC1788 (18,20) D 1967 SC1074 (8) O 1970 SC 564 (4) RF 1971 SC 306 (5,10) D 1973 SC1150 (9) RF 1973 SC1461 (1017) R 1978 SC 597 (128,129) RF 1980 SC1678 (3) R 1985 SC 736 (5,14) D 1985 SC1622 (13,15) RF 1992 SC1827 (2)
ACT:
Land Acquisition--Preliminary notification--Land needed forcompany--Non-mention of public purpose--LegalityProceedings, if violate fundamental rights--Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 4, 5A, 6, 40--Constitution ofIndia, Arts. 19(1)(f), 31.
HEADNOTE:
By a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, the State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) sought toacquire certain lands, including those of the petitioner,which were likely to be needed by a company, manufacturingsteel bars and rods, for its factory and buildings andappointed a Special Land Acquisition Officer to function asa Collector under s. 5A of the Act. The petitioner by anobjection filed before the said officer denied that thelands were required for a public purpose and prayed that theproceedings be quashed. By his petition to this Court underArt. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged thelegality of the notification under s. 4 of the Act on theground that it did not in terms say that the acquisition was

Page 2 of 9 for a public purpose, and that
The judgement of the court was delivered by
17130SINHA C.J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitutionimpugns the constitutionality of the land acquisitionproceedings with particular reference to the notificationunder s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referredto as " the Act ") in respect of an area of land withinthe district of Thana in the State of Bombay, now known asthe State of Maharashtra.In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this case,

Page 3 of 9 it is necessary to state the following facts. By a notification dated April 3, 1959, the first respondent, theState of Bombay (now Maharashtra) under s. 4 of the LandAcquisition Act of 1894, stated that the lands specified inthe schedule attached to the said notification were likelyto be needed for the purposes of the third respondent,Messrs. Mukund Iron & Steel Works Ltd... a companyregistered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and havingits registered office at Kurla, Bombay No. 37, in the Stateof Maharashtra, for its factory buildings etc. Thenotification further stated that under cl. (c) of s. 3 ofthe Act, the Government was pleased to appoint the SpecialLand Acquisition Officer, the second respondent, to performthe functions of the Collector under s. 5A of the said Act.The land in which the petitioner, who is a citizen of India,claims to be interested as owner is included in the scheduleaforesaid. The petitioner appeared before the secondrespondent aforesaid and after several adjournments lodgedobjections on June 9, 1959 and also made oral submissionsthrough his Advocate on that date and the day following, andrequested the second respondent to quash the proceedings onthe ground that the lands contained in the notification werenot required for any public purpose and that the proceedingswere vexatious and malicious. It was further stated beforethe second respondent that the third respondent hadnegotiated by private treaty for the purchase of thenotified area. The second respondent adjourned furtherhearing of the case in order to enable the petitioner andthe third respondent to come to an amicable settlement. Afurther hearing took place before the second respondent onJuly 15, 1959. On131that date the petitioner proposed to lead evidence of ownersof several pieces of land included in the area notified foracquisition to prove that the lands included in the scheduleto the notification were not as a matter of fact required bythe third respondent for any public purpose and that thethird respondent had even negotiated for the purchase of thesaid lands by private treaty, but the second respondentrefused permission to lead such evidence on behalf of thepetitioner.The petitioner raises a number of questions of law attackingthe constitutionality of the land acquisition proceedingsand prays for orders or directions to the State Governmentnot to give its consent to the aforesaid acquisition unders. 39 of the Act nor to enter into any agreement with thethird respondent under s. 41 of the Act nor to issue anotification under s. 6 of the Act declaring that the landin question is needed for a public purpose, because aftersuch a declaration the petitioner may be deprived of theopportunity of contending that the land was not needed for apublic purpose.The third respondent, through its Business Manager, has putin an affidavit in answer to the petitioner's case and hascontended that this writ petition is premature and notmaintainable, that so far, only a notification under s. 4 ofthe Act has been issued and objections under s. 5A on behalfof the petitioner have been heard by the second respondent,that the State Government has yet to be satisfied as towhether the acquisition is for purposes specified in s. 40of the Act and so long as the previous consent of the appro-priate Government has not been given, the provisions of ss.6 to 37 of the Act cannot be put into operation. It isdenied that the acquisition is not for a public purpose andthat the proceedings are vexatious or malicious. The third

Page 4 of 9 respondent does not admit that the second respondent refused permission to the petitioner to lead any evidence. Theaverments in the petition on the merits of the controversyare denied. It is stated on behalf of the third respondentthat public are vitally interested in the production of this132Company, the chief products being steel bars and rods whichare in great public demand and are of such vital necessityto the country that their very production, distribution,supply and price are controlled by the Government. Theproducts of the Company are consumed directly in bulk forpublic utility projects like dams, hydroelectric projects,roads, railways, industrial plants and housing projects,both in the public and private sectors, which constitute thecore of the several five year plans of the Government. Itis further stated that the Company (respondent No. 3) hasincluded in its proposed industrial expansion projects to beestablished on the land sought to be acquired, extensiveprovisions for housing for a large number of employees'families as also for their welfare by providing for parks,gardens, playgrounds, medical relief centre and similarother amenities for the welfare of the employees and theirfamilies. All those projects, it is claimed on behalf ofthe third respondent, are a " highly commendable publicpurpose " which is far more advantageous to the community ingeneral than to shareholders of the Company. It is furtherstated that the first respondent made a detailedinvestigation about the usefulness to the public of theexpansion project of the Company including employees'housing schemes and welfare projects and when it wassatisfied about, the bona fides of the respondent Companyand the genuineness and urgency of their projects and theirutility to the public that the first respondent publishedthe notification under s. 4 of the Act on April 3, 1959.The affidavit sworn to by the second respondent, SpecialLand Acquisition Officer, Thana, also questions themaintainability of the writ petition and generally supportsthe case sought to be made out by the third respondent. Itis also stated on his behalf that the petitioner or any ofthe other persons interested in the land sought to beacquired did not produce any evidence and that it wasabsolutely incorrect to say that he prevented anyone fromleading any evidence as alleged. The Special LandAcquisition Officer has made the following categoricalstatements:-133"It is denied that the acquisition of the said lands for thepurpose of the third respondent is in no way useful to thepublic or that the public are not entitled to the use of anyof the works of the Company as alleged by the petitioner. Isay that the products which are being produced and will beproduced are used and intended to be used inter alia inpublic undertakings intended for the general industrialdevelopment of the country. It is denied that the proposedacquisition is merely for the benefit of few individuals,namely, the shareholders of the Company as alleged by thepetitioner."Further on he adds the following:-" With reference to paragraph 13 of the said petition, it isdenied that I did not permit the petitioner to lead anyevidence before me as alleged by the petitioner. Thisallegation, I say, is absolutely dishonest and false. It isdenied that the notification issued by Government undersection 4 of the said Act is not bona fide or is an abuse ofthe powers vested in Government. It is denied that the said

Page 5 of 9 notification is illegal or that, it is not made in good faith ".On these allegations and counter allegations the petitionerhas moved this Court to exercise its powers under Art. 32 ofthe Constitution on the grounds that the notification unders. 4 of the Act is illegal, that the land acquisitionproceedings are in violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of theConstitution and that the acquisition is not for a publicpurpose and is mala fide.In order to determine the present controversy, it will beconvenient, at this stage, to examine the relevantprovisions of the Act. The Act has the following preamble:-" Whereas it is expedient to amend the law for theacquisition of land needed for public purposes and forCompanies and for determining the amount of compensation tobe made on account of such acquisition ;.........In the definition section 3, the definitions of " Company "and " public purpose " are particularly noteworthy. Theexpression " Company " has been used in a very comprehensivesense of including not only134the Companies registered under several statutes, Indian andEnglish, but also includes a society registered under theSocieties Registration Act of 1860 and a registered societywithin the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act. Theexpression " public purpose' includes the provision ofvillage sites in districts in which the appropriateGovernment shall have declared by notification in theofficial gazette that it is customary for the Government tomake such provision. It will thus be noticed that theexpression " public purpose " has been used in its genericsense of including any purpose in which even a fraction ofthe community may be interested or by which it may bebenefited. The proceedings begin with a Governmentnotification under s. 4 that land in any locality is neededor is likely to be needed for any public purpose. On theissue of such a notification it is permissible for a publicservant and workmen to enter upon the land to do certainacts specified therein with a view to ascertaining whetherthe land is adapted for the purpose for which it wasproposed to be acquired as also to determine the boundariesof the land proposed to be included in the scheme ofacquisition. It will be noticed that though the preamblemakes reference not only to public purposes, but tlso toCompanies, the preliminary notification under s. 4 hasreference only to public purpose and not to a CompanySection 5A, which was inserted by the amending Act of 1923and makes provision for hearing of objections by any personinterested in any land notified under s. 4, makes referencenot only to public purpose, but also to a Company. It isnoticeable that s. 5A predicates that the notification unders. 4(1) may not only refer to land needed for a publicpurpose, but also to land needed for a Company and after theenquiry as contemplated by s. 5A has been made and theCollector has heard objections, if any, by, interestedparties he has to submit his report to the Government alongwith the record of the proceedings held by him and hisrecommendations on the objections. Thereupon, theGovernment has to make up its mind whether or not135the objections were well-founded and the decision of theappropriate Government of those objections is to be treatedas final. If the Government decides to overrule theobjections and is satisfied that the land, the subject-matter of the proceedings, was needed for a public purpose

Page 6 of 9 or for a Company, a declaration has to be made to that effect. Such a declaration has to be published in theofficial gazette and has to contain the particulars of theland including its approximate area and the purpose forwhich it is needed. Once the declaration under s. 6 hasbeen made, it shall be conclusive evidence that the land isneeded for a public purpose or for a Company. Then followthe usual Proceedings after notice is given to the partiesconcerned to claim compensation in respect of any interestin the land in question ; and the award after making thenecessary investigation as to claims to conflicting title,the compensation to be allowed in respect of the land, and,if necessary, apportionment of the amount of compensationamongst the persons believed to be interested in the landunder acquisition. We are not concerned here with theproceedings that follow upon the award of the Collector andthe matters to be agitated therein.From the preamble as also from the provisions of ss. 5A, 6and 7, it is obvious that the Act makes a clear distinctionbetween acquisition of land needed for a public purpose andthat for a Company, as if land needed for a Company is notalso for a public purpose. The Act has gone further and hasdevoted Part VII to acquisition of land for Companies and insub-s. (2) s. of 38, with which Part VII begins, providesthat in the case of an acquisition for a Company, for thewords " for such purpose " the words " for purposes of theCompany " shall be deemed to have been substituted. It hasbeen laid down by s. 39 that the machinery of the LandAcquisition Act, beginning with s. 6 and ending with s. 37,shall not be put into operation unless two conditionsprecedent are fulfilled, namely, (1) the previous consent ofthe appropriate Government has been obtained and (2) anagreement in terms of s. 41 has been executed by theCompany.136The condition precedent to the giving of consent aforesaidby the appropriate Government is that the Government has tobe satisfied on the report of the enquiry envisaged by s.5A(2) or by enquiry held under s. 40 itself that the purposeof the acquisition is ;to obtain land for the erection ofdwelling house-, for workmen employed by the Company or forthe provision of amenities directly connected therewith orthat such acquisition is needed for the construction of somework which is likely to prove useful to the public. Whenthe Government is satisfied as to the purposes aforesaid ofthe acquisition in question, the appropriate Governmentshall require the Company to enter into an agreementproviding for the payment to the Government (1) of the costof the acquisition, (2) on such payment, the transfer of theland to the Company and (3) the terms on which the landshall be held by the Company. The agreement has also tomake provision for the time within which the conditions onwhich and the manner in which the dwelling houses oramenities shall be erected or provided and in the case of aconstruction of any other kind of work the time within whichand the conditions on which the work shall be executed andmaintained and the terms on which the public shall beentitled to use the work.Such are the relevant provisions of the Act that we have toconsider with reference to the question of theconstitutionality of the land acquisition proceedings nowimpugned. The first ground of attack is based on Art. 31(2)of the Constitution. The provisions of Art. 31(2) make itclear beyond all controversy that in order that property maybe compulsorily acquired, the acquisition must be for a

Page 7 of 9 public purpose and by authority of law. But Art. 31(5)(a) lays down that nothing in cl. (2) shall affect theprovisions of any existing law other than a law to which theprovisions of cl. (6) applies (and the Act is obviously alaw to which the provisions of cl. (6) do not apply).Therefore even if the Act contemplated acquisition for acompany which may or may not be for a public purpose, itwould be saved by Art. 31(5)(a) as an existing law. (SeeLilavati Bai v. State of Bombay (1)). Further, though itmay(1) [1957] S.C.R. 721.137appear on the words of the Act contained in Part 11, whichcontains the operative portions of the proceedings leadingup to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for aCompany may or may not be for a public purpose, theprovisions of Part VII make it clear that the appropriateGovernment cannot permit the bringing into operation theeffective machinery of the Act unless it is satisfied asaforesaid, namely, that the purpose of acquisition is toenable the Company to erect dwelling houses for workmenemployed by it or for the provision of amenities directlyconnected with the Company or that the land is needed forconstruction of some work of public utility. These require-ments indicate that the acquisition for a Company also is insubstance for a public purpose inasmuch as it cannot beseriously contended that constructing dwelling houses, andproviding amenities for the benefit of the workmen employedby it and construction of some work of public utility do notserve a public purpose. It is not necessary for thepurposes of this case to go into the question whetheracquisition for a Company, even apart from the provisions ofs. 40, will be for a public purpose, or justifiable underthe provisions of the Act, even on the assumption that itwill not serve a public purpose. The facts of the presentcase have not been investigated, as this Court was movedwhen only a notification under s. 4 of the Act had beenissued; and the purpose of the acquisition in question wasstill at the enquiry stage. By s. 38A, which was insertedby the amending Act of 1933, it has been made clear that anindustrial concern not being a Company, ordinarily employingnot less than 100 workmen, may also take the advantage ofland acquisition proceedings if the purpose of the acquisi-tion is the same as is contemplated by s. 40 in respect ofCompanies. It has been recognised by this Court in the caseof The State of Bombay v Bhanji Munji and Another (1) thatproviding housing accommodation to the homeless is a publicpurpose. In an industrial concern employing a large numberof workmen away(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777-18138from their homes it is a social necessity that there shouldbe proper housing accommodation available for such workmen.Where a large section of the community is concerned, itswelfare is a matter of public concern. Similarly, if aCompany is generous enough to erect a hospital or a publicreading room and library or an educational institution opento the public, it cannot be doubted that the work is one ofpublic utility and comes within the provisions of the Act.We are not in possession of all the relevant facts in thepresent case as to the exact purpose for which the land issought to be acquired. That investigation was in progresswhen the petitioner moved this Court. Hence, the contentionraised on behalf of the respondents that the application is

Page 8 of 9 premature is not wholly devoid of merit. But the main attack on the constitutionality of theproceedings in question was based upon the notificationunder s. 4, which is in these terms" Ex. " A ".NOTIFICATIONREVENUE DEPARTMENT.Sachivalaya, Bombay, 3rd April, 1959.LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 (1 of 1894).District Thana.No. LTH. 15-59/42051-H-Whereas it appears to the Governmentof Bombay that the lands specified in the schedule heretoare likely to be needed for the purposes of the Company,viz., for factory buildings, etc., of M/s. Mukund Iron andSteel Works Limited, Bombay. It is hereby notified underthe provisions of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (I of 1894), that the said lands are likely to beneeded for the purpose specified above.All persons interested in the said lands are hereby warnednot to obstructor interfere with any surveyors or otherpersons employed upon the said lands for the purpose of thesaid acquisition. Any contracts for the disposal of thesaid lands by sale, lease, mortgage, assignment, exchange orotherwise, or any outlay or improvements made therein,without the sanction of the Collector after the date of thisnotification will,139under section 24 (seventhly) of the said Act, be disregardedby the officer assessing compensation for such parts of thesaid lands as may be finally acquired.If the Government of Bombay is satisfied that the said landsare needed for the aforesaid purpose, a final notificationto that effect under s. 6 of the said Act will be publishedin the Bombay Government Gazette in due course. If theacquisition is abandoned wholly or in part, the fact will beduly notified in the Bombay Government Gazette.Under clause (c) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, the Government of Bombay is pleased to appoint theSpecial Land Acquisition Officer, Thana, to perform thefunctions of a Collector under section 5-A of the said Actin respect of the said lands."It is argued that in terms the notification does not statethat the land sought to be acquired was needed for a publicpurpose. In our opinion, it is not absolutely necessary tothe validity of the land acquisition proceedings that thatstatement should find a place in the notification actuallyissued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if,in substance, it is found on investigation, and theappropriate Government is satisfied as a result of theinvestigation that the land was needed for the purposes ofthe Company, which would amount to a public purpose underPart VII, as already indicated. See in this connection TheState of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another (1). In thatcase the question was whether the Bombay Land RequisitionAct (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) was invalid inasmuch as thepurpose for the requisition was not in express terms statedto be a public purpose. This Court laid it down that thestatute was not invalid for that reason provided that fromthe whole tenor and intendment of the Act it could begathered that the property was acquired either for thepurpose of the State or for any public purpose.It is further argued that s. 4(1) of the Act had deli-berately omitted the words " for a Company " and insistedupon a public purpose. The absence from the notificationunder s. 4 aforesaid of those words,

Page 9 of 9 (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R- 777. 140namely, for a public purpose, are fatal to the proceedings.The purpose if the notification under s. 4 is to carry on apreliminary investigation with a view to finding out afternecessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary,digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land wasadapted for the purpose for which it was sought to beacquired. It is only under s. 6 that a firm declaration hasto be made by Government that land with proper descriptionand area so as to be identifiable is needed for a publicpurpose or for a Company. What was a mere proposal under s.4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding foracquisition under the Act. Hence, it is not correct to saythat any defect in the notification under s. 4 is fatal tothe validity of the proceedings, particularly when theacquisition is for a Company and the purpose"" has to beinvestigated under s. 5A or s. 40 necessarily after thenotification under s. 4 of the Act.The other attack under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution isequally futile in view of the decisions of this Court inState of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another (1) and LilavatiBai v. State of Bombay (2). Nothing was said with referenceto the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, thoughthat Article has been referred to in the grounds in supportof the writ petition.For the reasons given above, this petition must be dismissedwith costs to the contesting parties. Petition dismissed.(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.(2) [1957] S.C.R. 721.141

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Judgement Profile

Case Number Writ Petition (Civil) 134 of 1959

Judgment Date 08-08-1960

Bench SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ),IMAM, SYED JAFFER,SARKAR, A.K.,WANCHOO, K.N.,SHAH, J.C.

CITED SECTIONS

  • Section.4 of Land Acquisition Act
  • Section.5 of Land Acquisition Act
  • Section.4 of of the Land Acquisition Act 1894
  • Section.5 of of the Land Acquisition Act 1894

CITED KEYWORDS