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RANA SHEO AMBAR SINGH vs ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., ALLAHABAD. On 1961-04-27

HEADNOTE

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8 Held, that the intention of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was to vest the proprietary rights inthe Sir and Khudkast land and grove land in the Estate byvirtue of s. 6(a)(i) and resettle it on the intermediary notas compensation but by virtue of his cultivatory possessionof lands comprised therein and on a new tenure and conferupon the intermediary a new and special right of Bhumidari,which he Dever had before, by s. 18 of the Act.The proprietary rights in Sir, Khudkast land and grove landwhich were mortgaged were extinguished, and the Bhumidariright which was altogether a new right could not be con-sidered to be included under the mortgage.442The mortgagee could only enforce his rights against themortgagor in the manner as provided by s. 6(h) of the Actread with s. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act and followthe compensation money; and so far as the Sir, Khudkast landand grove land were concerned, he could not enforce hisrights under the mortgage by the sale of the Bhumidarirights created in favour of the mortgagor against them as asubstituted security.In the instant case the Bhumidari rights created in favourof the appellant could not be sold in execution of thedecree held against him by the respondent under the mortgageOf 1914.Finally, it held that the bhumidarirights acquired by the444appellants under s. 18 of the Act could also be sold inex
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http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8 Held, that the intention of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was to vest the proprietary rights inthe Sir and Khudkast land and grove land in the Estate byvirtue of s. 6(a)(i) and resettle it on the intermediary notas compensation but by virtue of his cultivatory possessionof lands comprised therein and on a new tenure and conferupon the intermediary a new and special right of Bhumidari,which he Dever had before, by s. 18 of the Act.The proprietary rights in Sir, Khudkast land and grove landwhich were mortgaged were extinguished, and the Bhumidariright which was altogether a new right could not be con-sidered to be included under the mortgage.442The mortgagee could only enforce his rights against themortgagor in the manner as provided by s. 6(h) of the Actread with s. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act and followthe compensation money; and so far as the Sir, Khudkast landand grove land were concerned, he could not enforce hisrights under the mortgage by the sale of the Bhumidarirights created in favour of the mortgagor against them as asubstituted security.In the instant case the Bhumidari rights created in favourof the appellant could not be sold in execution of thedecree held against him by the respondent under the mortgageOf 1914.Finally, it held that the bhumidarirights acquired by the444appellants under s. 18 of the Act could also be sold inexecution of the decree.The appellant then took the matter in appeal to the HighCourt, and the two points urged before the High Court were(i) that the bhumidari rights created by s. 18 (i) of theAct could not be sold in execution of the decree, and (ii)that the application dated September 20, 1952, was a freshapplication for execution and as it was filed over 12 yearsafter the date of the amended decree it was barred by time.The High Court repelled both these contentions, and heldthat execution could proceed against the bhumidari rightscreated in favour of the appellant under s. 18 of the Actand further that the application dated September 20, 1952,was within time as it was not a fresh application and thedecree holder was only seeking to execute the decree inrespect of the property for the sale of which he had alreadyapplied within time allowed by law.That would nothowever make any difference in our view as to the legaleffect of the notification under s. 4 and under thenotification sir and khudkashat land and grove land wouldvest in the State and would not be an exception to theconsequences of vesting in s. 6 and therefore theproprietary right in sir450and khudkashat land and grove land which were mortgagedwould be extinguished and the bhumidari right which iscreated by s. 18 would be a new right altogether and wouldnot therefore be considered to be included under themortgage in this case.This brings us to a consideration of s. 6(h) of the Act.That lays down that "no claim or liability enforceable orincurred before the date of vesting by or against suchintermediary for any money, which is charged on or issecured by a mortgage of such estate or part thereof shall,except as provided in s. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882, be enforceable against his interest in the estate".This provision has in our opinion a, two-fold effect.
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SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT

1 of 8 PETITIONER: RANA SHEO AMBAR SINGH Vs.RESPONDENT: ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., ALLAHABAD. DATE OFJUDGMENT: 27/04/1961 BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N.BENCH:WANCHOO, K.N.GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.GUPTA, K.C. DASAIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA CITATION: 1961 AIR 1790 1962 SCR (2) 441 CITATOR INFO : RF 1962 SC1464 (19) F 1969 SC 971 (14,16) R 1970 SC1880 (3) D 1971 SC 77 (10) D 1971 SC1678 (6,13,14,20) R 1973 SC1269 (3) D 1975 SC2295 (8) RF 1977 SC1552 (1) ACT: Mortgage Decree-Proprietory rights in Zamindari-Executionproceedings pending -Zamindari rights abolished-Bhumidarirights confirmed on intermediaries--Mortgagor, if can sellBhumidari rights in execution-Relief available- U. P.Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. 1 of1951), ss. 6(a)(i), 6(h), 18. HEADNOTE: The appellant's father, a Talukdar of the Estate of Khajur-gaon, executed a simple mortgage of his proprietary interestin the estate consisting of sixty-seven villages to theAllahabad Bank Ltd. While execution proceedings werepending, the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950, came into force from July 1952. As a result, theZamindari rights of the appellant judgment-debtor wereabolished and it was no longer possible to sell these rightsin the 67 villages. The respondent Bank made an applicationbefore the executing court that as the Zamindari rightscould not be sold, only such rights of the judgment-debtoras remained in him after c
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PETITIONER: RANA SHEO AMBAR SINGH Vs.
RESPONDENT: ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., ALLAHABAD.
DATE OF
JUDGMENT: 27/04/1961
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.GUPTA, K.C. DASAIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
CITATION:
1961 AIR 1790 1962 SCR (2) 441 CITATOR INFO : RF 1962 SC1464 (19) F 1969 SC 971 (14,16) R 1970 SC1880 (3) D 1971 SC 77 (10) D 1971 SC1678 (6,13,14,20) R 1973 SC1269 (3) D 1975 SC2295 (8) RF 1977 SC1552 (1)
ACT:
Mortgage Decree-Proprietory rights in Zamindari-Executionproceedings pending -Zamindari rights abolished-Bhumidarirights confirmed on intermediaries--Mortgagor, if can sellBhumidari rights in execution-Relief available- U. P.Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. 1 of1951), ss. 6(a)(i), 6(h), 18.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant's father, a Talukdar of the Estate of Khajur-gaon, executed a simple mortgage of his proprietary interestin the estate consisting of sixty-seven villages to theAllahabad Bank Ltd. While execution proceedings werepending, the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950, came into force from July 1952. As a result, theZamindari rights of the appellant judgment-debtor wereabolished and it was no longer possible to sell these rightsin the 67 villages. The respondent Bank made an applicationbefore the executing court that as the Zamindari rightscould not be sold, only such rights of the judgment-debtoras remained in him after coming into force of the Act mightbe sold along with certain other rights.Objections were taken and finally the matter came up byappeal to the High Court and it, inter alia, upheld the viewof the executing court that the execution could proceedagainst the Bhumidari rights created in favour of theappellant under s. 18 of the Act.The question was whether the Bhumidari rights created unders. 18 of the Act could also be sold in execution of thedecree in view of the fact that the proprietary rights badvested in the State.

Page 2 of 8 Held, that
The judgement of the court was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted bythe Allahabad High Court. The brief facts necessary forpresent purposes are these. The appellant's father RanaUmanath Bakshsingh was the Talukdar of Khajurgaon. On July13, 1914, Rana Umanath Bakshsingh executed a simple mortgagein favour of the Allahabad Bank Limited (hereinafter calledthe respondent). The mortgage was for a sum of Rs. 6,00,000and the property mortgaged consisted of sixty-sevenvillages. In May 1924, the respondent filed a suit for therecovery of the balance of the unpaid mortgage money by thesale of the mortgaged property. In January 1925 apreliminary decree for the recovery of rupees four lacs andodd was passed, which was made final in July 1926 anddirected the sale of the mortgaged property, namely, theproprietary rights of Rana Umanath Bakshsingh in the sixty-seven villages. Then followed execution applications withwhich we are not concerned. In 1934, the U. P. 443Agriculturists' Relief Act was passed and thereupon anapplication was made by the judgment-debtor for theamendment of the decree under that Act. On October 19,1936, the decree was amended under the provisions of thatAct and thereafter the pending execution proceedings weredropped as installments had been fixed. Eventually, therespondent applied for execution on-May 25, 1940. Objectionwas taken to this application on the ground that it wasbarred by time; but this matter was decided against the

Page 3 of 8 judgment-debtor and thereafter the execution has been proceeding uptil now on this application.On July 1, 1952, the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and LandReforms Act, 1950 (1 of 1951), hereinafter called the Act,came into force. As a consequence of this enactment, thezamindari rights of the judgment debtor were abolished andit was no longer possible to sell these rights in the sixty-seven villages. Consequently, on September 29, 1952, therespondent made an application that as the zamindari rightscould not be sold, only such rights of the judgment debtoras remained in him after the coming into force of the Actmight be sold, namely, the rights in trees and wells inabadi and buildings situate in various villages under sale.It was also prayed that the judgment debtor's proprietaryrights in grove land and sir and khudkashat land had beencontinued under s. 18 of the Act and these constitutedsubstituted security in place of the proprietary rightsmortgaged with the respondent and they should also be soldFinally it was prayed that compensation money payable to thejudgment-debtor on the acquisition of the proprietary rightsby the State might be treated as substituted security.The appellant objected to these applications on variousgrounds. The execution court held that the buildings, treesand wells situated in the abadi were liable to be sold inexecution of the decree. It further held that therespondent was entitled to compensation amount granted bythe State to the appellant in lieu of zamindari rights assubstituted security. Finally, it held that the bhumidarirights acquired by the444appellants under s. 18 of the Act could also be sold inexecution of the decree.The appellant then took the matter in appeal to the HighCourt, and the two points urged before the High Court were(i) that the bhumidari rights created by s. 18 (i) of theAct could not be sold in execution of the decree, and (ii)that the application dated September 20, 1952, was a freshapplication for execution and as it was filed over 12 yearsafter the date of the amended decree it was barred by time.The High Court repelled both these contentions, and heldthat execution could proceed against the bhumidari rightscreated in favour of the appellant under s. 18 of the Actand further that the application dated September 20, 1952,was within time as it was not a fresh application and thedecree holder was only seeking to execute the decree inrespect of the property for the sale of which he had alreadyapplied within time allowed by law. The High Courttherefore dismissed the appeal. The appellant then obtaineda certificate to appeal to this Court; and that is how thematter has come up before us.The main point urged on behalf of the appellant is that thedecision of the High Court that bhumidari rights createdunder s. 18 of the Act can also be sold in execution of thedecree, is not correct. Under the mortgage deed, theproperty mortgaged consisted of the property forming part ofthe Talukdari of Khajurgaon detailed at the foot of themortgage, namely, the sixty-seven villages. Thus themortgage consisted of the proprietary interests only of themortgagor in the sixty-seven villages, and as it was asimple mortgage, possession of no part of the property wasgiven to the mortgagee. it is therefore contended by Mr.Aggarwala on behalf of the appellant that as the proprietaryright in the sixty-seven villages vested in the State underthe Act, the respondent who was only entitled to get theproprietary rights sold under the mortgage can now fall back

Page 4 of 8 only on compensation payable to the appellant under the Act, and reliance in particular is placed on s. 6 (h) of the Actin this connection. On the other hand, the contention on 445behalf of the respondent is that bhumidari rights arisingunder s. 18 of the Act are liable to be sold as theyrepresented the proprietary rights which were mortgaged andin any case they can be sold as substituted security inplace of the property mortgaged.We have therefore to look into the scheme of the Act inorder to decide between the rival contentions. It is not indispute that the Taluka of Khajurgaon was an estate withinthe meaning of the Act. It may be mentioned that thejudgment-debtor had certain sir and khudkashat lands andzamindar's grove in the sixty-seven villages comprisedwithin the Talukdari estate. Section 4 of the Act providesfor vesting of an estate in the State on the making of anotification thereunder and the Taluka of Khajurgaon hasvested in the State by virtue of such a notification madeunder s. 4. Section 6 prescribes the consequences of thevesting arising under s. 4 and we may refer to s. 6(a) (i)as that will show in what the interests of the judgment-debtor ceased and became vested- in the State:- "(a)-all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries- (i) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites hats, bazars or melas (other than hats, bazars, melas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of section 18 apply), and . ............................................ . shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances." Clause (h) of s. 6 is also material and is in these terms: "(h) no claim or liability enforceable or incurred before the date of vesting by or against such intermediary for any money, which is charged on or is secured by a mortgage of such estate or part thereof shall, except as provided in section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, be enforceable against his interest in the estate." 57 446All lands therefore whether cultivable or barren or grovelands vested in the State on the notification under s. 4having been made save as otherwise provided in this Act.Therefore, proprietary rights in Sir and khudkashat land andgrove land would vest in the State on the coming into forceof the notification under s. 4 unless there was someprovision otherwise in the Act. The contention of therespondent therefore that sir and khudkashat land and groveland continued to be the property of the appellant and wouldtherefore remain liable to be sold in execution proceedingswould fail in view of the notification under s. 4, unless ofcourse there is a provision otherwise in the Act. The onlyprovisions otherwise on which the respondent relies are ss.9 and 18 of the Act. So far as s. 9 is concerned, it iscertainly a provision otherwise and it provides as follows:-

Page 5 of 8 "All wells or trees in abadi, and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed."This provision clearly creates an exception to the propertywhich vests in the State on the making of a notificationunder s. 4. The exception is in favour of all wells andtrees in abadi and all buildings and it is significant tonote that these things will continue to belong to theintermediary, though the further provision shows that thesite of the wells, and buildings with the area appurtenantthereto would vest in the Government and would be deemed tobe settled with the intermediary on such conditions andterms as may be prescribed. The effect therefore of s. 9 isthat wells, trees in abadi and buildings apart from the landunder them continue to belong to the intermediary (and theappellant is undoubtedly an intermediary within the meaningof the Act); but even here the 447land on which the buildings and the wells stand vest in theState and it is deemed settled with the intermediary onterms and conditions to be prescribed. So far therefore aswells and trees in abadi and all buildings are concerned,these continue to belong to the appellant and if they arecovered by the mortgage they would be liable to sale. As wehave already pointed out, there was no dispute before theHigh Court with respect to wells, and trees in abadi andbuildings and it was conceded there that these were liableto be sold, the only dispute being with respect to bhumidarirights created under s. 18.Let us now turn to s. 18 and see whether it is also aprovision otherwise like s. 9. The relevant part of s. 18for our purposes is in these terms:- "(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands- (a) in possession of or held or deemed to be held by an intermediary as sir, khudkashat or an intermediary's grove, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary, lessee, or tenant, grantee or grove-holder, as the case may be, who shall subject to the provisions of this Act be entitled to take or retain possession as a bhumidar thereof."It is well to contrast the language of this section with thelanguage of s. 9. Section 9 lays down that trees and wellsin abadi and buildings shall continue to belong to theintermediary and that shows that it was a provisionotherwise excepting these three items from vesting in theState by virtue of the notification under s. 4 and itsconsequence under s. 6; but there is no provision in s. 18of the Act to the effect that sir and khudkashat land andintermediary's grove shall continue to belong to theintermediary. Therefore, sir and khudkashat land and groveland would vest in the State by virtue of s. 6 (a) (i) forthere is no provision otherwise in s. 18 in that behalf. In

Page 6 of 8 this connection we may refer for comparison to s. 23 of the 448Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, No. VIof 1952 (hereinafter called the Rajasthan Act) whichprovides that "notwithstanding anything contained in thelast preceding section (i.e. s. 22, which refers toconsequences of resumption), all khudkashat lands of aJagirdar etc. shall continue to belong to or be held by suchjagirdar or other person". If the intention of the Act Wasnot to vest sir and khudkashat land and grove land in theState we would have found an exception similar to that foundin the Rajasthan Act. Section 9 itself shows in what mannerthe legislature was making an exception when it did notintend that a particular property should vest in the State.If the intention were that sir and khudkashat land and groveland should not vest in the State, s. 18 would have beenworded in the same way as s. 9. Further the way in which s.18 is worded, (namely that khudkashat and sir land and anintermediary's grove shall be deemed to be settled with theintermediary and he would have bhumidari rights therein)shows that these three kinds of property vested in the Stateunder s. 6(a)(1) and were then resettled with theintermediary on a new tenure and not in the same right,which he had in them before the vesting. The legislaturewas therefore creating a new right under s. 18 and the oldproprietary right in sir and khudkashat land and anyintermediary's grove land had already vested under s. 6 inthe State. Therefore, it cannot be said that s. 18 is anexception to the consequences provided in s. 6 and thereforesir and khudkashat land and grove land continue to be theproperty of the judgment debtor in this case in the samemanner as they were his property at the time of the mortgageand would therefore be available in execution of the decreeas the proprietary rights mortgaged. We are of opinion thatthe proprietary rights in sir and khudkashat land and ingrove land have vested in the State and what is conferred onthe intermediary by s. 18 is a new right altogether which henever had and which could not therefore have been mortgagedin 1914.Our attention in this connection was drawn to the 449compensation sections in the Act, and it was urged that whatwas given to the intermediary under s. 18 was really his oldright because no compensation was to be paid to him withrespect to what was left to him under s. 18. The firstsection to be considered in this connection is s. 39 whichdeals with gross assets of a mahal. In these gross assetsthe amount computed at the rates applicable to the ex-proprietary tenants of similar land for land in the personalcultivation of or held as intermediary's grove, Khudkashator sir by all the intermediaries in the estate was to beincluded subject to certain exceptions which are immaterialfor our purposes. The very fact that in the gross assetsthe rents of these lands in which the bhumidari rights werecreated under s. 18 were taken into consideration shows thatthese lands also vested in the State; if that were not sothere was no necessity for including these assets in thegross assets for the purposes of compensation. Here againwe may refer to a similar provision in the Rajasthan Act forpurposes of comparison. The second Schedule to that Actprovides how gross income is to be calculated and incalculating the gross income the income from khudkashat landhas not been taken into account because it was excepted fromthe consequence of resumption under s. 23 of that Act. Itis true that under s. 44 of the Act when calculating net

Page 7 of 8 assets, the income from sir and khudkashat land and grove land has been excluded on the ground that bhumidari rightshave been conferred therein under s. 18 of the Act. That ishowever for the purposes of calculating what should, be paidto the intermediary as compensation and in that connectionit was necessary to take into account the fact that thelegislature was creating a new right in the intermediarywith respect to certain lands and therefore it was notnecessary to give money as compensation. That would nothowever make any difference in our view as to the legaleffect of the notification under s. 4 and under thenotification sir and khudkashat land and grove land wouldvest in the State and would not be an exception to theconsequences of vesting in s. 6 and therefore theproprietary right in sir450and khudkashat land and grove land which were mortgagedwould be extinguished and the bhumidari right which iscreated by s. 18 would be a new right altogether and wouldnot therefore be considered to be included under themortgage in this case.This brings us to a consideration of s. 6(h) of the Act.That lays down that "no claim or liability enforceable orincurred before the date of vesting by or against suchintermediary for any money, which is charged on or issecured by a mortgage of such estate or part thereof shall,except as provided in s. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882, be enforceable against his interest in the estate".This provision has in our opinion a, two-fold effect. Inthe first place, it makes it impossible for the mortgagee tofollow the proprietary right after it vests in the State.Secondly, it provides that the only way in which themortgagee can recover his none advanced on the security ofthe property which vested in the State by virtue of thenotification under s. 4 and the consequences thereof unders. 6 is to follow the procedure under s. 73 of the Transferof Property Act. Section 73(2) provides that "where themortgaged property or any part thereof or any interesttherein is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1of 1894), or any other enactment for the time being in forceproviding for the compulsory acquisition of immovableproperty, the mortgagee shall be entitled to claim paymentof the mortgage money, in whole or in part, out of theamount due to the mortgagor as compensation". There is nodoubt that the property mortgaged has been compulsorilyacquired in this case by the State under the Act.Therefore, s. 6 (h) read with s. 73 directs that themortgagee shall proceed in the manner provided in s. 73,namely, follow the compensation money, and there is no otherway possible for him in view of s. 6(h) with respect to theproperty which has been acquired under the Act. We haveheld that sir and khudkashat land and grove land have beenacquired under the Act and have vested in the State;therefore the mortgagee is relegated to enforce his rightsagainst the mortgagor in the manner provided in s. 73 of the451Transfer of Property Act and in no other way. What we sayhere does not affect that property which is not acquired bythe State, for example, property excepted under s. 9 of theAct; but where the property has vested in the State byvirtue of a notification under s. 4 and its consequencesunder s. 6, the only course open to the mortgagee is tofollow the compensation money under s. 6(h). The bhumidarirights created under s. 18 are not compensation; they arespecial rights conferred on the intermediary by virtue of

Page 8 of 8 his cultivatory possession of the lands comprised therein. The respondent therefore cannot enforce his rights under themortgage by sale of the bhumidari rights created in favourof the appellant under s. 18 so far as his sir andkhudkashat land and grove land are concerned; it can onlyfollow the compensation money as provided in s. 6(h). Theargument that bhumidari rights can 'be followed assubstituted security must therefore equally fail.Our attention in this connection was drawn to s. 8(2) of theU. P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act, No. XV of 1953. ThatAct provides for scaling down of debts of zamindars whoseestates have been acquired under the Act. It also providesthat the debts due shall be realisable from the compensationand rehabilitation grant, and in particular s. 8(2) providesthat "notwithstanding anything in any law the reduced amountfound in the case of a mortgagor or judgment-debtor as thecase may be, under section 3 or 4 as respects mortgagedestates shall not be legally recoverable otherwise than outof the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to suchmortgagor or judgment debtor in respect of such estates".We have not been able to understand how the provisions ofthe U. P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act can affect the con-struction of s. 6(h) of the Act read with other provisionsof the Act. It is not necessary for us therefore toconstrue s. 8(2) of the U. P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act,for we are clear on the provisions of s. 6 (h) and the otherprovisions of the Act that bhumidari rights created infavour of the appellant cannot be sold in execution of thedecree held against him by the respondent under the mortgageof 1914.452This brings us to the question of limitation. Mr. Aggarwalaconceded that if the appellant succeeds on the first pointit would not be necessary for us to consider the question oflimitation. Therefore, as the appellant succeeds on thefirst point we need not consider whether the application forexecution by sale of bhumidari rights created under s. 18 isbarred by limitation.We therefore allow the appeal and direct that the executionof the decree by the respondent will not be levied againstthe bhumidari rights created in favour of the appellantunder s. 18 of the Act. The appellant will get his costs ofthis court and of the High Court. Costs of the executioncourt will be at the discretion of that Court.Appeal allowed.

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Judgement Profile

Case Number Appeal Civil 301 of 1960

Judgment Date 27-04-1961

Bench WANCHOO,K.N.

CITED SECTIONS

  • Section.4 of Land Acquisition Act
  • Section.6 of Land Acquisition Act
  • Section.4 of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950
  • Section.6 of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950

CITED KEYWORDS